OIL GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA AND MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA, 2010-2014
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ABSTRACT
The relationship between the contradictions of rentier oil governance in Nigeria and their implications for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) was investigated in this paper. The study specifically examined the impact of security leakages in the management of oil resources in Nigeria; the proliferation of armed groups’ protests over mismanagement of oil rent in Nigeria;
and the margin of oil revenue in relation to fishing in Nigeria, on the sustenance of illegal oil trade, the rise of illicit arms trade and use, and the ineffective control of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, the central concerns of this study are:
Do security flaws in Nigeria’s oil resource management account for the continuation of illegal oil trading in the Gulf of Guinea? Is the increase in violent oil rent demonstrations in Nigeria leading to an increase in illicit weaponry trade and use in the Gulf of Guinea?
Was Nigeria’s prioritisation of oil money to blame for inefficient management of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Gulf of Guinea?
The Rentier state theory was used as our analysis framework, and data was acquired using the documentary method of data gathering. Our data analysis was qualitative descriptive, and we used an ex-post facto research approach.
The investigation discovered security leaks in Nigeria’s oil resource management through the complicity of oil marketers, Private Military Contractors (PMCs), and state security officials.
responsible for the continuation of illegal oil trade in the Gulf of Guinea. The study also discovered that the development of violent oil rent protests in Nigeria, as a result of oil wealth deprivation,
oil patronage conflicts, and governmental persecution of citizens’ agitation against oil wealth mismanagement, has resulted in an increase in illicit weaponry trade and use in the Gulf of Guinea.
Finally, the study discovered that the prioritisation of oil revenue in Nigeria due to the rentier nature of oil resource management was implicated in the inadequate control of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. Our findings imply that the undemocratic structure of Nigerian oil governance leads to criminal collaboration.
Dissatisfied politicians and non-state entities, primarily armed gangs, formed to increase their primitive access to oil revenue. The research recommends that Nigeria democratise its oil resource management and dissuade non-state entities from intervening in the control of oil and other marine activities in the Gulf of Guinea.
CHAPITRE ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background Of The Study
Over the last two decades, there has been a spike in international concern about marine safety and security, with particular emphasis on the threat that maritime insecurity poses to global business, peace, and stability (Ukeje & Mvomo-Ela, 2013).
This heightened attention has, in turn, gathered around the need to critically reassess conventional thinking as it relates to maritime geopolitics, and to understand how such feeds into existing policies and actions at the national, regional, continental, and global levels.
The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) has become one of the world’s most dangerous maritime locations in the last decade. marine insecurity, according to a Crisis Group research from 2012,
is a regional concern that jeopardises the development of this vital economic area, affecting marine trade in the near term and the stability of coastal governments in the long term.
The GoG is a big, diversified, and vital territory. It is made up of about 16 countries that are connected by over 6,000 km of unbroken coastline. Senegal, Sierra Leone, and others are from Africa’s northwestern coast.
On the southernmost rims are Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Island State of Sao Tome and Principe, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola (Agence Congolaise de Presse, 2012:1).
In recent years, the GoG waterways have acted as a crucial worldwide gateway for practically all of its littoral countries, which rely on sea access for the import and export of goods and services from and to major global markets. Ukeje and Mvomo-Ela state:
As a result of globalisation, the region is quickly becoming important for international navigation as a comparatively safer, albeit lengthier, route connecting the Far East to countries on both sides of the Atlantic.
Given that over 90% of global freight is transported by sea, the GoG has become a veritable sea-route for world trade and business, especially now that the shorter Arab Gulf passage is more expensive and risky due to increased oil prices.
Middle Eastern and North African warfare and piracy (Ukeje & Mvomo-Ela, 2013:9). Through missionary, commercial, and consular efforts, the GoG has historically been crucial to the penetration, progress, and consolidation of the European colonial enterprise and presence in Africa.
Thus, at the height of European pacification efforts in Africa, the GoG was a battleground for unparalleled economic, political, diplomatic, and military conflicts between main European colonial powers vying for access to and control over new areas (Ukeje & Mvomo-Ela, 2013).
During that time, the GoG was the focal point of enormous trans-Atlantic economic links connecting Africa and Europe. During this time, trade relations were controlled by the United States.
Slavery, palm oil, rubber, ivory, gold, and other commodities were exported, while firearms and ammunition, alcohol, and spirits were imported (Blade, 2012).
Because of its importance in fostering international trade in the region, maritime security is a growing concern in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). Energy commerce is heavily reliant on sea-based shipping, and the region currently supplies roughly 5.4 million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d).
This is more than the total amount imported by the EU’s 27 countries in 2008 and more than half of the United States’ crude oil imports in 2008 (Ukonga, 2013:3).
Oil production from the region in 2011 was equivalent to 40% of total EU 27 consumption and 29% of total US petroleum consumption in the same year, with Nigeria accounting for roughly 50% of overall oil supply in the region (Ukonga, 2013:3).
International interest in the GoG has grown dramatically in recent years as its volume of global trade has surged as a result of the discovery of major oil and natural gas deposits along the coast and offshore. Some deposit-rich countries have sparked widespread and growing attention.
According to Ricardo (2007), the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) has become one of the primary sources of oil and gas imported by Europe, the United States, China, India, and Brazil, with Nigeria and Angola serving as the region’s primary producers for several decades.
The Gulf’s raw materials and hydrocarbons make it an increasingly coveted zone that attracts the attention of many actors, including local communities claiming rights of use and a share of the wealth generated by these resources, states eager to maintain sovereign control, and private companies that have been operating there for some time (Riols, 2011).
Maritime security is without a doubt critical to ensuring the flow of earnings from oil and gas, which have the potential to greatly contribute to regional growth. Maritime security is also critical for harnessing maritime resources, as well as ensuring livelihood and development.
Many Africans rely on maritime resources such as seafood, agriculture, and intact ecosystems for a living (Ukonga, 2013). In the Gulf of Guinea, fish stocks constitute an essential source of protein.
For example, between 2002 and 2007, Angola’s yearly per capita food supply from fish and fisheries products was 14kg per person, which was higher than the sub-Saharan average of 8kg (Ukonga, 2013:5). Furthermore, fish is an essential component of the diet of the region’s lowest 40% of the population.
One of the two significant challenges emerging in Africa is the rise of maritime instability, which is accompanied by the expansion of radical Islam in the Sahel. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB),
the GoG has become one of the world’s most dangerous maritime zones, owing to a steady increase in occurrences of pirate attacks in recent years, with potentially disastrous consequences for both development and the global economy.
According to Ukonga (2013), there has been an increase in armed robbery at sea and piracy; theft of hydrocarbon resources on the high seas/illegal oil bunkering; pipeline damage, and illicit trafficking in persons.
guns, narcotics, and people; and illicit, unreported, and uncontrolled fishing in the region’s waterways. Between 2003 and 2011, piracy in the GoG accounted for roughly 30 percent of incidents in African waters. According to the IMB study from 2013, the attacks saw an increase in the use of violence against crews, which is projected to continue.
Until recently, countries in the GoG were primarily concerned with land-based security concerns, with the maritime components receiving less attention in the formulation and implementation of security and defence alternatives and policies.
According to Ukeje and Mvomo-Ela (2013), this may be attributable in part to a capacity deficiency that many countries in the region suffer in terms of the purchase, maintenance, deployment, and requisite resources required to create and exercise credible presence on territorial seas.
The region’s maritime vulnerability is more severe in GoG republics with stronger economies. Nigerians, for example, account for more than half of the region’s estimated 300 million people. The Nigerian market accounts for more than 60% of the region’s trade volume, making it the largest economy in the GoG (Crisis Group African Report No. 156, 2012).
Nigeria produces over 70% of regional GDP, and its oil industry is the most important in the region. Oil is the most lucrative export in the region, accounting for more than 70% of total foreign exchange profits for GoG states.
Nigeria produced 2.2 billion of the GoG’s 2.9 billion barrels per day in 2009, and the country possesses 37.2 billion barrels of the region’s total proven resource of 42.9 billion barrels (Johnson et al, 2012:14). Nigeria produced 47 percent of the total 5.4 million barrels per day (mbpd) of crude oil in the Gulf of Guinea in 2012 (Ovadia, 2013).
For several decades, Nigeria has been the largest regional oil producer and, probably, the worst afflicted by marine insecurity of all GoG states. Renewed worldwide interest in countering marine insecurity as a result of the rise of illegal maritime trade operations in the GoG has highlighted the importance of not just collaboration between GoG nations and foreign partners, but also efficient maritime security coordination among GoG states.
Furthermore, the rise in organised criminal activity in the GoG, such as illegal oil trade, illicit arms trafficking, and IUU fishing, is linked to the rise in oil-producing GoG nations.
To put it another way, the marine domains of oil-producing countries, particularly Nigeria, account for the majority of illegal maritime traffic in the GoG.
This shows a link between oil resource management and marine security challenges in the GoG. According to the European Union’s Council of Foreign Affairs report from 2014, more than half of the 551 pirate and armed robber assaults and attempted attacks in international waters and national jurisdictions happened off the coast of Nigeria.
The survey also stated that the Nigerian coast accounted for more than half of all documented occurrences of oil vessel attacks and hijackings in the Gulf of Guinea.
The preceding implies that instability along Nigeria’s coast is linked to maritime insecurity throughout the Gulf of Guinea. As a result, assessments of maritime insecurity in the GoG necessitate an understanding of the paradoxes of rentier oil governance in Nigeria and their consequences for the region’s growth in maritime insecurity.
As a result, the primary goal of this research was to investigate the inconsistencies of rentier oil governance in Nigeria and their consequences for the growth in maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) between 2010 and 2014.
The basis for this breadth arises from the fact that worldwide interest in maritime security in the GoG gained traction beginning in 2010 as a result of increased security concerns in the Middle East as a result of Arab turmoil.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
According to the United Nations Security Council, the oceans surrounding Africa’s west coast, known as the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), constitute a possible threat to international security and the global economy, as indicated by Resolutions 2018 and 2039, respectively, issued in 2011 and 2012.
However, the semantic restrictions of “piracy,” as defined by the UN as solely illegal activities occurring on the high seas, leave a hole in how to protect against those same acts occurring within the territorial waters of a state or nations within the GoG (Keeney, 2014). Nigeria alone is expected to have lost $1 billion in revenue.
Every month, crude oil is lost due to piracy and oil bunkering (Crisis Group African Report, 2012).
In addition to piracy, the international world is concerned about the hazards posed by narcotics, illegal guns, and people trafficking in the GoG. According to a 2008 assessment by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 50 tonnes of cocaine reach West Africa each year before being transported to Europe,
where it is sold for over US$ 2 billion. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the GoG is also a source of worry for regional states. According to a research supported by the United Kingdom government and the Pew Charitable Trusts, the yearly cost of IUU fishing is estimated to be between US$ 10 billion and US$ 23 billion.
Scholars have attempted to explain why the GoG has seen an increase in activities that jeopardise marine security in recent years. Regarding the surge in illegal oil commerce in the region, authors such as Albert-Didier (2013),
Ukeje & Mvomo-Ela (2013), and Antangana (2007) attribute the increase of oil-related crimes, particularly piracy, to the region’s inadequate maritime policy.
This viewpoint is disputed by the Crisis Group’s 2012 African study, which claims that the attitude of states in the GoG towards their territorial seas has altered since the discovery of oil, with most of them investing significant resources to developing marine policy.
The weak legal framework argument, as stated in the 2005 report of the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), is related to the weak marine policy argument. This is mirrored in the institutional capacity of most states’ security services to respond to distress calls along the coast related to armed robbery at sea and piracy.
Similarly, Ukeje and Mvomo-Ela (2013) observed that inherent flaws in the criminal justice system impede stakeholders’ efforts to enforce rule compliance or impose fines in the event of violations. However, this reasoning just highlights the difficulties that relevant agencies confront in pursuing perpetrators.
Riols (2011), Ukeje & Mvomo-Ela (2013), and Ukonga (2013) have all attributed the surge in illegal oil trafficking in the GoG on a lack of cooperation between global and regional efforts to tackle marine instability in the region.
This argument is undermined by the fact that it only focuses on measures to combat high-seas crime; it fails to explain why there is an increase in the number of persons in the GoG involved in oil-related crimes.
As previously stated, the rise in illegal oil trafficking in the GoG is linked to the rise in oil-producing states in the region. The Nigerian economy accounts for more than 60% of the total economy of the GoG, and her nationals account for more than half of the total population of around 16 nations in the region.
Furthermore, Nigeria dominates the oil-related commerce, which provides for 70% of the region’s foreign exchange revenues. Illegal oil commerce in the GoG has largely been linked to an increase in oil-related crimes in Nigeria’s maritime domain.
As a result, there is a need to comprehend the nature of oil resource management in Nigeria, as well as the GoG’s proclivity and vulnerability to illegal oil trading.
Rentier management characterises Nigeria’s oil wealth. One of the consequences of rentier management is that the state tends to limit its direct involvement in oil extractive activities while shifting the burden of ensuring oil production safety away from the state and onto non-state actors such as International Oil Companies (IOCs) and Private Military Contractors (PMCs).
The Nigerian state’s legitimization of private security management in the oil business also contributes to weak regulation of the operations of state security services in the oil industry, because the responsibility of producing oil rent does not fall on the state.
As a result, this study focused on the relationship between security flaws in oil resource management in Nigeria and the continuation of illegal oil trading in the Gulf of Guinea.
Scholars have attempted to link the rise in the number and use of illicit weapons in the GoG to the demise of the Soviet Union. Oche (2005) reported on the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the selling of stockpiled surplus weaponry.
Naylor (2001) and Darkwa (2011) reported on non-state actors’ capacity to access and purchase weapons that were previously unavailable to them during the Cold War era.
The hypothesis tying the growth in non-state actor acquisition of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to the end of the Cold War, on the other hand, fails to explain why there was a significant rise in demand for SALW in the GoG, notably by non-state players.
Scholars such as Che (2007) and Ayissi & Sall (2005) have attributed the expansion of illicit arms trade and use in the region on the porous nature of borders in GoG states.
They contended that it would be difficult to find any government in the world capable of properly controlling the kind of borders that GoG states have as a result of arbitrary delimitation of both land and marine boundaries by Colonial powers prior to most African states’ political independence. Arms dealers take advantage of the situation to smuggle SALW into the region.
This theory, however, fails to explain why the proliferation of illicit SALW in the GoG is a recent occurrence.
Scholars such as Kollicoat (2006), Bourne (2007), Boutwell & Klare (1999),
and Ayissi & Sall (2005) attribute the growth of illicit arms trade and use in the GoG to factors such as simplicity and durabiliy, low cost and widespread availability, portability and concealability, lethality, and civilian usability.
The sporadic rise in demand for SALW in the GoG by non-state actors is a recent phenomenon, and there is a need to place more emphasis on the demand-side perspective, rather than the current over-emphasis on the production and supply perspectives, as over 80% of illegal weapons in the region circulate among non-state actors and criminal groups in oil-producing states,
particularly Nigeria. In this light, our study looked at the relationship between the surge in illicit arms trade and use in the Gulf of Guinea and the spread of violent oil rent demonstrations in Nigeria.
Similarly, one popular argument in the literature links inefficient IUU fishing regulation to gaps in fishing legislation, corruption, and the presence of poverty in the GoG (Stiles, 2013; EJF, 2012; Martini, 2013; Che, 2007; Ayissi & Sall, 2005; Fabra, 2002).
Brooke, 1988; Johnson, 1993).
They reported that IUU fishing is more likely to occur and has a greater impact in countries where governance is poor and corruption is prevalent.
Most of the reasons for inadequate IUU fishing management in GoG, such as the existence of loopholes in fishing legislation, corruption, and the prevalence of poverty, point to a lack of political will and/or complicity on the side of the government to combat IUU fishing. Furthermore, oil-producing governments in the GoG, particularly Nigeria, have shown the least political resolve to combat IUU fishing.
Nigeria has been routinely designated as one of the top ten countries in the world whose fishing policies are used to enable IUU fishing since 2010. While most scholarly arguments about a lack of political will are true, such arguments fail to explain why there is a lack of such political will in regulating an industry.
Economic activity that generates revenue for the Nigerian economy. To understand this, compare the levels of revenue accrued to Nigeria from oil and other revenue sources, such as fishing, the dominance of oil income in the Nigerian economy, and limited government regulation of the other sectors.
As a result, this study looks into the relationship between Nigeria’s prioritisation of oil money and ineffective control of IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. To that end, the contradictions of rentier oil governance in Nigeria, as well as the concomitant security leaks,
violent protests, prioritisation of oil money, and their implications for the increase of maritime insecurity in the GoG, have yet to be thoroughly examined. This study explicitly addressed the identified gaps in the existing literature. As a result, the following research questions guided us:
1. Do security flaws in Nigeria’s oil resource management account for the continuation of illegal oil trading in the Gulf of Guinea?
2. Is the increase in violent oil rent demonstrations in Nigeria leading to an increase in illicit weaponry trade and use in the Gulf of Guinea?
3. Was Nigeria’s prioritisation of oil money responsible for ineffective management of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Gulf of Guinea?
1.3 Objectives of The Study
The research has both broad and specialised goals. The study’s overarching goal was to investigate the inconsistencies of rentier oil governance in Nigeria, as well as their consequences for the increase of maritime instability in the Gulf of Guinea.
The study specifically aims to accomplish the following:
1. To investigate if security flaws in Nigeria’s oil resource management contributed to the continuation of illegal oil trading in the Gulf of Guinea.
2. To ascertain whether the expansion of violent oil rent demonstrations in Nigeria has resulted in an increase in illicit weaponry trade and use in the Gulf of Guinea; and
3. To determine if Nigeria’s prioritisation of oil revenue contributed to the ineffective control of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
1.4 Significance of the Research
This research has both theoretical and practical implications. On a theoretical level, the paper examines the consequences of the increase of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea by studying the tensions of rentier oil governance in Nigeria.
The study deviated from scholarly theories that attribute marine insecurity to issues such as weak maritime legislation, limited institutional ability of nations in the GoG, a lack of political will on the side of the leadership, and poor regional collaboration.
Rather, the study focuses on the tensions of rentier oil governance in Nigeria, as represented in issues such as security leakages in oil resource management, violent oil rent demonstrations, and oil revenue prioritisation.
Practically, the study will be of great relevance and benefit to policymakers, executors, and stakeholders interested in addressing maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea for the following reasons:
The study enriches public consciousness on how such leakages, mostly associated with rentier management of oil resources, lead to the sustenance of illegal oil trade in the GoG by clarifying issues and facilitating understanding on security leakages in the management of oil resources in Nigeria, as well as their prevention. It will also provide essential insight into how a rentier’s transition occurs.
Converting the economy to a ‘production’ economy can help solve the problem.
The study will also broaden public understanding of the link between the spread of oil rent protests in Nigeria and the rise in illicit arms trade and use by terrorist groups in GoG.
The study will also show the relationship between the government of Nigeria’s complacency in effectively controlling Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in their maritime domain and the prioritisation of oil money over fishing.
The study’s ability to demonstrate a link between the paradoxes of foreign oil capital’s dominance in Nigeria’s domestic economy and the
The government’s ineffectiveness un combating IUU fishing in the GoG will also provide significant insight into the pernicious dilemma of rentier oil governance in the GoG.
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