THE EFFECT OF INCENTIVE PACKAGE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Study’s Background
It is undeniable that teachers make a difference. Everyone has always known this, including students, parents, teachers, principals, and even casual observers. However, it has only recently been estimated how much of a difference teachers make. Teachers are arguably the most influential school factor influencing student achievement (Hanushek, 2002). We know that teachers can make a significant difference in their students’ learning.
Policies and procedures governing where and how teachers work must reflect the importance of teachers in the educational process. The task is to create policies that increase the number and equitable distribution of teachers who promote high rates of learning.
Some reformers concentrate on improving skills through better pre-service and in-service training (Hill, “2007); others concentrate on teacher recruitment strategies (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff and Wyckoff, 2007). However, the reform that requires the most attention at the local, state, and national levels is providing performance incentives for teachers. This approach is supported by two theories of action.
One is that incentives matter, and if there were incentives or rewards for doing so, teachers would produce more student learning (or at least put in more effort to produce student learning). The second is that, because current compensation or remuneration policies generally do not differentiate teachers based on characteristics other than longevity of service and courses taken,
introducing compensation-based methods of recognizing and rewarding performance could make teaching a more appealing career option. Both approaches also assume that rewarding excellence may put to better use the funds that are currently available in the traditional compensation system, in which teachers are rewarded for characteristics (such as certification and experience) that are only weakly related to teacher effectiveness (Obadara, 2012).
Teacher incentive programs are policies that explicitly link a teacher’s pay to the performance of their students. Such programs were extremely rare until the 1990s, but in the last 15 years, they have become much more common, primarily in the United States.
In the United States, programs in Rhode Island (beginning in 1999), Denver (beginning in 1999-2000), and Douglas County, Colorado (1994) are examples (Olsen, 1999; Education Commission of the States, 2000). They typically offer annual merit pay ranging from 10% to 40% of an average teacher’s monthly salary (American Federation of Teachers, 2000). Other countries have also started teacher incentive programs.
Two examples are Israel, which provides incentives to teachers based on student performance (Lavy, 2002), and a World Bank-funded program in Mexico that provides incentives to primary school teachers based on performance.
Teachers currently face weak incentives, with pay determined almost entirely by educational attainment, training, and experience, rather than performance, according to proponents of teacher incentive programs (Harbison and Hanushek, 2002; Hanushek, Kain & Steven, 1998; Hanushek, 1996; Lockheed and Verspoor, 20 11).
They claim that tying teachers’ pay to student performance will motivate teachers to work harder. Opponents argue that because teachers’ tasks are multidimensional and tests can only measure a subset of learning dimensions, tying teacher compensation to test scores gives teachers an incentive to sacrifice promoting curiosity and creative thinking in pursuit of skills tested on standardized exams (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 2010; Hannaway, 2012).
However, in many developing countries, such as Nigeria, teacher incentives are typically very weak. High rates of teacher absenteeism and a high turnover rate in the profession are evidences of this. According to Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremmer, Muralidharan, and Roger (2006), primary school teachers were absent from school 27% of the time in Uganda, 25% in India, 14% in Ecuador, and 11% in Peru.
According to Glcwwe, Bias, and Kremer (2003), teacher absenteeism in Kenyan rural primary schools is 20%. Even when Kenyan teachers arrive at school, they are frequently absent from the classroom; classroom observation data show a 27 percent teacher absenteeism rate. According to data from Nigeria, there is a 21 percent teacher absenteeism rate in rural secondary schools and a 28 percent turnover rate in Nigerian secondary schools (Jacobson, 2005).
Given this context, proponents of teacher incentives appear to have a stronger case in developing countries like ours than in developed countries, i.e., in an environment with very weak incentives. As a result, this study investigates the impact of an incentive package on the performance of secondary school teachers.
1.2 statement of the Problem
Over the years, the majority of teacher grievances have always stemmed from the school system’s failure to implement functional and effective incentive schemes. More often than not, this results in a deviant attitude of teachers toward schoolwork, as evidenced by a high rate of absenteeism and a lack of commitment to effective student teaching.
It is extremely rare for teachers, particularly in public schools, to complete their teaching subject’s work schedule. Slow learners no longer receive personalized instruction (extra attention) unless they pay the teacher privately. Extra lesson syndrome for extra pay is prevalent in both public and private schools.
All of these issues led to poor performance, low morale, restlessness, and deviant behavior on the part of both the teacher and the students. Due to the instillation of bribery, corruption, and other malpractices in our school system, students’ poor performance in
examinations such as (SSCE, NECO, and JAMB) and the deteriorating standard of education in our society is becoming more problematic than ever. Based on the foregoing, the purpose of this study is to ascertain the relationship between the incentive scheme and the job performance of secondary school teachers in the Lagos Metropolitan Area.
1.3 The Study’s Objective
The primary goal of this research is to determine the impact of an incentive package on the performance of secondary school teachers in Lagos state. More specifically, the study intends to:
1. Determine the relationships between work incentives and secondary school teacher attendance.
2. Determine the relationships between work incentives and teachers’ scheme of work coverage.
3. Examine the relationship between the incentive package and teacher performance.
4. Investigate the difficulties teachers face in obtaining their incentive package.
1.4 Question for Research
1. Are there any links between work incentives and teacher attendance in secondary schools?
2. Are there any links between work incentives and teachers’ scheme of work coverage?
3. What is the relationship between the incentive package and teacher performance?
4. What difficulties do teachers face in obtaining their incentive package?
1.5 Hypothesis of Research
Ho: There is no significant relationship between the incentive package and teacher performance.
Hello, there is a significant relationship between the incentive package and teacher performance.
1.6 Importance of the Research
The study is critical for secondary school management bodies to recognize the importance of establishing a solid reward and incentive system in their school in order to improve effective teacher performance and achieve good results for their students.
The study is also important for Head Teachers and Parent Teachers Committees to understand the best way to motivate their teachers and thus improve teacher performance. The study’s findings will also assist employers (Ministry of Education) and policymakers in developing informed policies or making decisions about how the reward system should be awarded.
Finally, this study will serve as a guide and reference point for future studies on incentives and teacher performance.
1.7 The Study’s Scope
The study will look at the effectiveness of a school incentive package on the performance of teachers in secondary schools in Lagos state. Public secondary schools in Oshodi/Isolo LGA will be used for this study.
THE EFFECT OF INCENTIVE PACKAGE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS
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