The Role of the State Government in the Insulation of Jigawa State  against Boko Haram Insurgency (2009-2015)

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..         xii

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1        General Background to the Study…………………………………………..            2

1.2       Statement of the Research Problem…………………………………………           4

1.3       Research Questions………………………………………………………….           5

1.4       Aim and Objectives………………………………………………………….           5

1.5       Research Assumptions………………………………………………………           6

1.6       Significance and Justification of the Study………………………………….           6

1.7       Scope of the Study…………………………………………………………..            7

1.8       Organization of the Study……………………………………………………           7

1.9       Conceptual Clarification……………………………………………………..          8

1.9.1 The Concept of Insurgency…………………………………………………..            8

1.9.2 The Concept and Methods of Counter Insurgency…………………………..            13

1.9.3 The Concept of Insulation…………………………………………………….           16

 

CHAPTER 2

 

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

2.1       A Review of Selected Cases of Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies …….          17

2.1.1 The Mau Mau Insurgency and the Counterinsurgency of the

Colonial Government in Kenya (1952–1956)……………………………….           17

2.1.2 Overview of the African National Congress (ANC) Insurgency  and the Apartheid Governments Counterinsurgency in

South Africa (1960-1990)…………………………………………………….         19

2.2       An Overview of Selected Insurgent Movements in

Post-Independence Nigeria………………………………………………… ..          24

2.2.1 Declaration of Niger Delta Republic, Movement for the

Emancipation of the Niger Delta and related insurgencies……………………..         25

2.2.2 Nigerian Civil War (Biafra War) …………………………………………….           26

2.2.3 Odua People‟s Congress………………………………………………………          26

2.3       A Review of the Theories of Insurgent Activities in Nigeria…………………        27

2.3.1 Politics, Economics and Insurgency in Nigeria……………………………….          27

2.3.2 Ethnicity/Religion and Insurgency in Nigeria…………………………………         29

2.4       An Overview of the Boko Haram Insurgency…………………………………        31

2.5       The Geography and Historical Phases of the

Boko- Haram Insurgency………………………………………………………       33

2.6       Review of the Response of the Nigerian Government

against the Boko Haram Insurgency……………………………………………       44

2.7       Theoretical Framework of the Study…………………………………………..        48

2.7.1 The Conflict Management Theory……………………………………………..         48

2.7.2 The Territorial Imperative Theory…………………………………………………. 51

 

CHAPTER 3

 

METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

 

3.1       Geography and Historical Overview of the Study Area…………………….            53

3.2       Population of the Study Area……………………………………………….            54

3.3       Sample of the Study…………………………………………………………            55

3.4       Sources of Data Collection………………………………………………….            56

3.5       Method of Data Analysis …………………………………………………..             58

 

CHAPTER FOUR

 

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS INSULATING JIGAWA STATE AGAINST BOKO-HARAM

 

4.1       Social Capital, Territorial Imperative and the Insulation of

Jigawa State against Boko-Haram…………………………………………..           59

4.2       Socio-Economic Development and the Insulation

of Jigawa State against Boko-Haram……………………………………….           61

4.3       The Reinvigoration of Jigawa State Security Council and  the Intensification of Intelligence Gathering Against Boko-Haram……..….       66

4.4       The Establishment of Temporary IDP Camps and the

Insulation of Jigawa state against Boko-Haram Insurgency…………………          68

4.5       Validity of Research Assumptions …………………………………………..          70

 

CHAPTER 5

 

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1       Summary…………………………………………………………………….           72

5.2       Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..            74

5.3       Recommendations……………………………………………………………          75

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………….          76

Appendix……………………………………………………………………………..          79

ABSTRACT

Since 2009, the Boko-Haram insurgency became deadly and extremely violent particularly in the three north-eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Other states which were also significantly affected by the Boko-Haram insurgency include: Kano, Bauchi, Kaduna and the Federal Capital Territory. Jigawa state which shares borders with Kano, Bauchi and Yobe states was however relatively insulated from the Boko Haram insurgency. This study therefore examined how and why Jigawa state was insulated from the Boko-Haram insurgency. The major objective of the study was to investigate what socio-economic and political factors accounted for the insulation of Jigawa state against the Boko-Haram insurgency. The study was conducted within the framework of the conflict management theory which argues that conflict is not a static situation but a dynamic one in which the level of intensity changes over a conflicts‟ life cycle. The territorial imperative theory was also adopted in the explanation of the social factors that resulted in the insulation of Jigawa state against the Boko-Haram insurgency. As a qualitative Study, the data for this study was sourced essentially through primary sources of data. The primary data was derived from interviews with the political elite in Jigawa state. These political elite comprised of the government agents directly involved in protecting Jigawa state from the Boko-Haram insurgency as well as members of the opposition political parties from 2007-2015. Other respondents of the study include the religious and traditional leaders as well as representatives of the Nigerian Police Force and Department of State Security. Focus group discussion was also held in four local governments in the state. Secondary data on the other hand was derived from libraries and the internet. Findings indicate that unlike in the communities in the neighboring states which were devastated by the Boko-Haram insurgency, there was a high degree of social capital amongst the elites and the people of Jigawa state which significantly contributed in the insulation of the state against the Boko-Haram insurgency. Other findings of the study also indicates that three major programs namely: the socio-economic development of the state, the reinvigoration of the state security council and the establishment of temporary IDP camps, also contributed in the insulation of Jigawa state against the Boko-Haram insurgency. Finally the study recommends that efforts should be made towards boosting social capital by fostering peaceful coexistence and cooperation amongst Nigerians through the avoidance of ethno-religious profiling and discrimination. The study also recommends that efforts should be made towards improving the socio-economic development of the country in general through the implementation of programs and policies that impact positively on the lives of the citizens. This is important considering the fact that an improvement in the living standard of the people is established as a disincentive for the recruitment drive of insurgents.

 

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1        General Background to the Study

Insurgencies have generally been an issue of concern to many states across the globe. They exist in various forms; perpetuating terrorist and violent activities that strike at the corporate existence or the ideological basis of states. From the Taliban in Afghanistan to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as well as the north-east India and communist insurgency in the Philippines, each insurgency is different in its aims, structures and strategy. Yet, all insurgencies are similar in the sense that they represent a usually violent revolt that is not recognized as belligerency.

In Nigeria, a number of insurgencies have arisen in the post-independence period, ranging from those based on socio-economic, ethnic or religious considerations. The first known insurgency in post-colonial Nigeria may be credited to the movement to liberate the Niger Delta people led by Major Isaac Jasper AdakaBoro in 1966. Boro formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an armed military group composed of 150 of his kinsmen in the belief that the people of the Niger Delta deserved a more equitable share of the wealth which accrued from oil. On the 23^rd of February 1966, the NDVF declared the Niger Delta Republic. The Republic however, lasted only 12 days before the federal military forces crushed the insurgency and arrested Boro (Kwaja, 2013). Since then other insurgent groups that have emerged in Nigeria include: the Odua People‟s Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the

Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the recent Boko-Haram Insurgency.

Since July 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency increased its violent attacks against the Nigerian state and its citizens, unleashing a systematic campaign of suicide bombings, kidnappings and drive-by shootings on diverse government and civilian targets. In a report by the US Department of Justice,Boko -Haram reportedly engaged “in over six hundred attacks on various targets, including government institutions, government officials, churches, mosques, schools, bars, and other businesses as at 2013” (Goitom, 2014:2). In addition to the deaths of an estimated fivethousand people, the group isalso said to have caused “the displacement of over six hundred and fifty thousand Nigerians as at 2013″ (Goitom, 2014:2).

In May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe; the states mostly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency; and the Nigerian military was deployed in a counter offensive against the insurgency. However, such emergency measures seemed not to have deterred the group; as it continued its deadly attacks up till the end of the Jonathan administration in 2015. Following an intensified offensive against Boko Haram, thousands of Nigerians including some members of the Boko Haram insurgency began fleeing from the north east into neighboring states and countries; thereby expanding the scope of the insurgency and the associated insecurity. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Up to 10,000 Nigerians fled to Niger‟s Diffa region in 2015. Cameroon was also reported to be hosting some 44,000 Nigerian refugees in the same year, while another 2,700 were reported to havefled to Chad (UNHCR, 2015). By 2016, some 2.2 million people were internally displaced in the northeastern and other neighboring states in Nigeria due to the Boko

Haram‟s insurgency and also as a result of the counter-insurgency measures adopted by the Nigerian state (Ibrahim and Obels, 2017:1).The impact of the Boko- haram insurgency was not only felt across Nigeria; particularly in states in the north eastern and north western region but also in neighboring countries like Niger, Chad and Cameroon. However, the scale and scope of the insurgency varied significantly across different states, regions and communities.

Jigawa state in north-west Nigeria was one of the states confronted with the influx of internally displaced persons and fleeing members of the Boko-haram insurgency. However, in comparism to other neighboring states like Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano and Yobe states, Jigawa state remained relatively insulated from Boko Haram attacks and the humanitarian crisis associated with the insurgency. In a report by Thisday newspapers it was noted that Boko Haram has since 2009, carried out dozens of attacks in surrounding areas, but Jigawa itself has been spared much of the violence (Thisday, 10^th April, 2014).

Since the beginning of the insurgency in 2009, the first and only major attack by the Boko Haram insurgents in Jigawa state was in April 2014 when members of the group attacked a police station, a bank and a Shari‟ah Court inGwaram local government area where they killed a number of policemen and civilians. While Jigawa state experienced only isolated attacks by the Boko haram insurgents, Kano, Bauchi and Yobe states which shared border with Jigawa state were repeatedly attacked by the Boko-haram insurgents and these states were also generally seen as recruitment centers for the terrorists.

1.2        Statement of the Research Problem

The major areas affected by the Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria are the three north-eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. Other states like Bauchi, Kano,

Kaduna and the federal capital territory were also significantly affected by the crisis. Jigawa state which shares border with Kano, Bauchi and Yobe state was generally, relatively insulated from the Boko-Haram crisis. This study therefore investigates why and how Jigawa state was able to remain relatively insulated from the Boko-Haram crisis. The study particularly examinesthe socio-economic and political factors which may have contributed in the relative insulation of the state from the negative effects of the Boko-Haram insurgency from 2009-2015.

1.3        Research Questions

In view of the above research problem, the specific research questions to be addressed in this study include:

1. Were there any social factors peculiar to Jigawa state as a community that contributed in the insulation of the state from the negative effects of the BokoHaram Insurgency?
2. What if any; are the policies and programs introduced by the Jigawa state government against the Boko-Haram insurgency?

• How were the policies and program implemented and in what ways (if any) did the program contribute in the insulation of Jigawa state from the negative consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency?

1.4        Aim and Objectives

The general aim of this study is to determine the factors that accounted for the relative insulation of Jigawa state from the Boko-Haram insurgency. The more specific objectives of the study include:

1. To determine if there were any social factors peculiar to Jigawa state which contributed in the relative insulation of Jigawa state from the Boko haram insurgency.
2. To investigate if there were any policies or programs by the Jigawa state government which contributed in the insulation of the state from the BokoHaram insurgency.

• To determine how any of such policies or programs by the Jigawa state government may have contributed to the relative peace in Jigawa state.

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1.5        Research Assumptions

This study was guided by the following assumptions.

1. The insulation of Jigawa state from the Boko-haram crisis was as a result of the existence of peculiar social factors within the state which served a counter terrorist purpose.
2. Jigawa state was relatively insulated from the Boko-Haram insurgency due to the existence of policies and programs which served a counter terrorist purpose.

1.6       Significance and Justification of the Study

The Boko-Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria has attracted a lot of scholarly attention (Sani S. 2015, Alozieuwa S. H. 2012, Okoli, A. C., &Iortyer, 2014, Aghedo, I, &Osumah, O. 2012 and Osumah, O. 2013). However, most of the works conducted have either focused on the causes of the crisis or attempted to evaluate the government‟s response to the crisis at the national level. For example, Otegwu (2016) and Jae (2017) are recent works that both examined the management of the Boko-haram insurgency; but their emphasis was on the role of the federal government. Indeed, very few studies have focused on the response of state governments to the Boko-haram insurgency. This study is therefore significant in the sense that it seeks to evaluate the role of state governments and the community in the management of the Boko-Haram insurgency. The study thus represents a micro analysis of efforts at managing the insurgency, rather than the usual macro analysis that has ensued in the discourse on the subject matter.

1.7       Scope of the Study

The Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria gained national and international attention in 2009; even though the group had been in existence since 2003. Since 2009, the federal government of Nigeria and the international community has taken various steps in addressing the crisis. Yet, the insurgency though largely suppressed, continues to engage in sporadic attacks in northern Nigeria. This study focuses on the role of the state government in the management of Boko-haram insurgency. The study particularly focuses on Jigawa State and it covers the period 2009-2015 due to the fact that this was when the Boko Haram insurgency was at its peak.

1.8       Organization of the Study

This work is organized into five chapters. Chapter one is a general background to the study which comprise of the introduction, statement of the research problem, research questions, aims and objectives of the study and the research assumptions of the study. Also contained in chapter one is the justification and scope of the study. The second chapter comprise of the literature review and the theoretical framework of the study. Chapter three is a detailed presentation of the method of data collection and analysis and a general background of the study area. Chapter four isthe data presentation and analysis while chapter five contains the summary, conclusion and recommendation.

1.9        Conceptual Clarification

1.9.1 The Concept of Insurgency

The concept of insurgency is complex, relative, and difficult to define because it been has been used interchangeably with other concepts like terrorism, revolution, guerrilla warfare etc. While insurgency has existed for centuries, it has been conceptualized and consequently, addressed, in innumerable ways. Prior to the 1900s, insurgency was generally considered to be a nuisance for states, especially empires with powerful, conventional militaries that were primed to fight the armies of fellow states, not a ragtag collection of fighters with light weapons. Due to this asymmetry, such armed groups would not directly confront a state with unmatched military capabilities; instead, they engaged in guerilla (Spanish for “small war”) warfare, which included hit-and-run tactics in order to exploit a conventional military‟s inability to deviate from a highly organized and structured protocol. Thus, insurgencies were conceptualized as tactical struggles to force states into engaging in long, protracted wars of attrition in order to exhaust both their resources and willpower.An insurgency may therefore be defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow or destruction of a constituted government through the use of subversion, espionage, terrorism and armed conflicts (Hayden 2007). Indeed, insurgencies are uniquely distinguishable from terrorist groups in that their primary objective is state control and sovereignty, which they achieve by incrementally garnering popular support. Using targeted military force themselves, insurgents seek to emulate Max Weber‟s definition of a state, that is, an entity

that possesses a monopoly of force and legitimacy within a given territory.

According to Drew (2001), an insurgency can also be defined as an armed revolution against the established political order. Drew continues that: “Pure. Insurgencies are internal affairs of states as they do not require assistance from foreign powers” (2001:4). In this context, insurgency is therefore synonymous with civil wars. Despite Drew‟s (2001) suggestion that insurgencies are essentially part of the internal affairs of states, he also acknowledge that it is not uncommon for insurgencies to receive international support:

Although pure insurgencies are civil wars, the situation becomes less clear-cut when outside powers intervene in some manner. Often such intervention is mostly in the form of supplying material aid to one side or the other, or providing professional revolutionaries (e.g. the Cuban revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara in Bolivia) who can organize and discipline what might otherwise be a haphazard affair easily crushed by the government in power. Intervention has been common as the major powers fished in “troubled waters” in the hope of gaining advantage in the perceived zero-sum game of international power politics. When intervention draws the attention of an opposing power, an insurgency can quickly be cast as a major power confrontation. The fact remains that insurgencies are, at base, internal affairsunless the role of one or both sides is co-opted by an intervening power (Drew: 2001:4).

 

Thus, while insurgency may be limited to a single nation, in modern times, it almost always impacts on international relations. Indeed, the insurgents, government or both may be clients of other nations and in most cases there is usually a spillover especially in the form of refugees beyond national borders.

The concept of insurgency has also been defined as a protracted political-military activity directed towards completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organization. Insurgent activities (including guerrilla warfare, terrorism and political mobilization, for example propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization and international activity) is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common denominator of most insurgent groups in this context is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country.

An insurgency therefore generally refers to the activities of a group or groups seeking political power through armed conflict or other illegal means under the rules of the existing government. Seeking political power in this context does not necessarily mean replacing the government. Indeed, an insurgent group may only want to share power or it may prefer to just breakdown a strong government so that local militias may have a strong control.

According to O‟Neill, (2005: 1) Insurgencies have been essential in nation building activities since the earliest histories. O‟Neill explains, that “insurgency has probably been the most prevalent type of armed conflict since the creation of organized political communities” (O‟Neill, 2005: 1). O‟Neill thus defines insurgency as: “a general overarching concept that refers to a conflict between a government and an out group or opponent in which the latter uses both political resources and violence to change, reformulate, or uphold the legitimacy of one or more of four key aspects of politics” (O‟Neill, 2002, as cited in Taber, 2002). These aspects of politics are, “(1) the integrity of the borders and composition of the nation state, (2) the political system, (3), the authorities in power, and (4) the policies that determine who gets what in societies” (O‟Neill, 2002, as cited in Taber, 2002). O‟Neill notes that insurgent activity is a form of “political movement” with a specific aim and the political aim of insurgencies thrives in situations wheresocietal divisions are cumulative and where they combine with economic and political disparities” (O‟Neill, 2005: 4).  It should be noted also that referring to a group as insurgent also depends on perspective. The patriots of the American Revolution were for example called an insurgency and considered treasonous by the British, while the colonist saw them as fighting for the preservation of their freedoms and independence.

Insurgencies have existed in many countries and regions including the Philippines, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Yemen, Djibouti, Colombia, Srilanka, democratic republic of Congo, the colonies of Great Britain and Nigeria. Each insurgency also has different specifics. However, they all share a common feature of an attempt to disrupt the central government by means considered illegal by that government. Most insurgent groups therefore have the same intermediate objectives designed to help them achieve eventual domination of a country. Although both military and political means are used to achieve these intermediate objectives, insurgencies are essentially political (Moveh, 2017). Some of the objectives of insurgencies include:

1. To limit the ability of the government and enhance the capability of the insurgents to provide public services.
2. To obtain support or neutrality of critical segments of the population.
3. To isolate the government from international diplomatic and material support and increase international support for the insurgents
4. To increase the domestic and international legitimacy of the insurgent organization at the expense of the government.
5. To destroy the self-confidence of government leaders and cadres, causing their abdication or withdrawal.
6. To reduce and if possible, neutralize government coercive power while strengthening insurgent coercive capabilities.

 

It is also important to note that many insurgent movements may be highly organized. Yet, this may not always be the case. North (2008) for example notes that:

While some insurgencies are networked with only loose objectives and mission type orders to enhance their survival, others are divided and factionalized by area, composition or goals.

 

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